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MEXICO'S OPENING TO FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT
James K. Weekly

While the attention of the U.S. public and business sector has been riveted upon the dramatic economic changes occurring in Eastern Europe, a similar transformation has been taking place just next door. Mexico is also
engaged in a sweeping effort to overcome its severe economic difficulties by
opening its statist and tight ly-protected economy to private enterpri e and
to global trade and competition.
otwithstanding the chronic tendency of most U.S. residents to overlook
events in the rest of the Western Hemisphere, the e developments in Mexico
are likely to have a much greater and more immediate impact upon the U.S.
economy than tho e tran piring in Eastern Europe. This is due to the fact
that the economies of the two neighboring countries have become highly integrated and interdependent. U .S.-Mexican trade has grown very rapidly in
recent years, and Mexico now ranks third behind Canada and Japan among
U.S. trading partners. The U. . is by far the dominant foreign supplier of
investment capital to Mexico, accounting for 63 percent of accumulated foreign investment in that country in 1988. nd despite the friction that it has
generated, the ma ive cross-border migration of workers has been an important source of labor for a great many U.S. industries. The United States,
thus, has a heavy stake in the outcome of Mexico' current program to re tructure and revuahze it economy.
One of the key elements in that program is a new approach to foreign direct
investment (FD I). In the pa t, Mexico maintai ned control on uch investment which were stringent and nationalistic e,en by Latin American standards. But the Mexican government began rela,ing tho e control on an
informal basi in the mid-I 980s, and u recently expanded and formalized
that liberalization movement. This paper examine this turnabout in Mexican attitudes and policies toward FDI and con ider ho11 it may affect direct
investment in Mexico by U.S. and other foreign companies.
faolution of FOi Policic
Prior to 1973, Me,ico did not ha,e a general law pertaining to foreign
direct investment. everthele s, such invest ment wa effectively regulated
through a combination of establi hed pri nciples and practice , statutory re trictions, and presidential decrees. Tho e included the comprehensive application of the Calvo doctrine, under which foreign inve tor had to agree to
be treated a Mexican nationals and to waive the right of diplomatic protection from their home government; prohibition or limitations on foreign participation in certain basic indu trie , uch as mining, petroleum,
transportation, and electric power generation; and the emergency decre_e ?f
1944, which required foreign invest0rs to obtain permis ion from the Mini 55

try of Foreign Relations before acquiring an interest in Mexican properties
or companies and gave that Ministry broad discretionary powers to grant
or deny such permission.
Those various requirements, and the manner in which they were interpreted
and applied, created a sort of de facto foreign investment code which was
recognized by both the Mexican government and foreign investors. One
dimension of that code was the screening of new investments by the Ministry of Foreign Relations or the Ministry of lndustr> and Commerce. Dunng
the I950s and 1960s, more and more imestment proposals were subjected
to such governmental review, and the review process increasingly entailed
the imposition of conditions for approval of a proposed investment. Chief
among those conditions \,as a requirement that the foreign investors Join
with Mexican owners, often as minority partners in a joint venture. It was
in this gradual and some\1 hat ad hoc fashion that "\tex1camLation" emerged
as a fundamental goal and guideline for the establishment or expansion of
business enterprises in Mexico (Wnght, 197 I).
In 1973, \lexico enacted a La\, for the Promotion of :'\texican lmestments
and the Regulation of Foreign Investments. That law essentially consolidated and codified the rules and procedures pertaining to foreign investment
that had previously been in effect It maintained oumght prohibitions or
specific ceilings on foreign part1c1pation in several sectors of the economy
and established a blanket limit of 49 percent for such foreign 0\I nership
It also made it clear that foreign 1mestors \1ere \1elcome 111 Mexico only so
long as they engaged in Joint ventures in \\hich effective control was in Mex
ican hands, thereb:-, officialh confirming the nation's commitment to \le,
1canization (Ramsaran, 1985).
The 1973 L 3\1 came into effect during the presidenual administration of
Lui, Eche\c -r1a. and ns enactment and subsequent rigorous enforcement con
tributed to mounting concerns among foreign investors O\er what they regarded as a strong anti-business bias in that admimstrauon Those concerns
precipitated a decline in both foreign and \lcx1can private 111\estment \\h1ch,
together \1 ith several other adverse internal and external de\elopments, resulted in a serious deterioration of economic cond111ons in l\1cxico (Loonej.
1978) 8:-, the end of Eche\ema's term of office 111 1976, the grO\\lh of the
Me,1can economy had fallen well bclO\\ thi.: \igorous rate that had bi.:cn realized throughout the pre\ ious t\\0 decades. fhc cou111ry had abo gone hea\ 1I) into debt, as borro\,ing from abroad had replaced inflows of direct
imestment capital, and the peso \his devalued after l\\enty-two years of a
siable exchange rate. Mexico thus entered mto a period of severe economic
stress, \\hich \1as temporarily suppressed by the "oil boom" of 1978-81, but
\1 hich erupted into a full-blown crisis in 1982.
Despite its gr0\11ng economic difficulties, Mexico clung to 11s restricmc
policies toward r:O1, and that combination resulted in a precipitous fall in
such investment during the early 1980s. As Table I sho\\S, Mexico's experience
in that regard \,as considerably 11orse than that of Latin America as a \\hole,
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and its share of total fDI in the region plummeted from 41 .5 percent in 1980
10 just 12.3 percent in 1985
Table I
Foreign Direct ln,estment in Mexico and Latin America
(millions of dollars)
Year

FDI in
Mexico

FDI in Latin
America

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
19 9

2,155
2,836
1,657
461
391
491
1,522
3,248
2,595
2,242

5,195
7,151
5,483
2,912
2,859
3,981
3,321
5,624
8,113
6,574

Mexico•~ hare of FDI
in Latin America
4l.5<t'o
39. 7
30.2
15.8
13.7
12.3
45.8
57.8
32.0
34.1

(Figures for Laun \merica include .\rgentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia. Co,ta
Rica, Ecuador, \Jc,1co, Peru, Lrugua), and Venezuela)
Source. Instnute of International 1-inance, FoMering Foreign Direct lmestmenl in Latin America(\\ a,hington. Instuute ot Internauonal Financ~. lnL.,
1990), 23
~lc,1co' dire economic ,ituation C\entuall~-compelled the gO\ernment 10
mah fundamental change, in the narion·, de\elopmcn1 strateg1e, and policie, Tho,e change,. \\ hich began in earne,1 in I%5, ,, ere de,1gned to reduce
the public sector of the econom~. ,, hile ,imultaneou,1' 111aea,ing the effic1enq of the pn\ate bu,ine\\ ,ector The measures underlaken for those purposes included the liquida11on or transfer 10 private O\\nership of numerou
public enterpme,. the elimination of subs1die, and price controls, and the
reducuon of barriers 10 impom {Banco Nac1onal de \Je,1co, 19 5)
That mo"ement to pri, auze and open the ~le,1c.an econom} extended into
the realm of foreign direct 1mes1men1. Although the nation did not immediate!; make official changes in us FO i policies, the government began nego11a1ing more nex1ble terms "ith foreign companie, wi hing 10 invest or expand
in 1e,ico. That ne,ibilit) included a relaxation of its long- tanding insistence on majorit; o,,nership by Me,1can interests The most notable in tance
of I his was the case of I B I ; in Jul), 19 5, the government agreed to allo"
that company to retain full ownership of a computer manufacturing facility
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to be built in Mexico, after having previously denied such permission (Levy
and Szekely, 1986).
Another action which affected FDI during this period was the Mexican
government's approval of debt-for-equity S\\aps. In J une, 1986, a program
was initiated \\hich authorized foreign investors to purchase Mexican debt
at a discount on the secondary international market and then to exchange
that debt for pesos to be invested in Mexico. The Mexican government offered
pesos equivalent to 75 to 100 percent of the face \'alue of the debt, depending upon the type of project in \\ hich those pesos would be invested.
Inasmuch as those conversion rates substanually exceeded the discounted
price of the Mexican debt, this program pro\ed anracuve to companies wishing to invest in Mexico. Approximate() $2 billion m S\\aps \\ere approved
in 1986 and 1987, and 70 percent of ne\\ foreign investments involved the
use of those arrangements (Inter-American Development Bank, 1988).
The Mexican government ,uspended the swap program in November, 1988,
attributmg that suspension to concern, that the ,waps might be contributing
to infla11on. HO\\ever, debt- for-equit) con\'ers1ons were reinstituted in April,
1990, although eligible ime,tments are to be limited to infrastructure proJect,
and to privatization of state-O\\ned enterprise, (Busines, International, 1990).
Formal Liberalization of FOi Regulation,
The unofficial loosening of Mexico\ FOi politics de,eribcd above appears
to ha\ e had a favorable impact, a, the amount of such imcstment rose sub'>tantially in 1986 and 1987, both m absolute terms and 111 relation to the total for Lalin America (Table I). HO\\C\er, crn1c1'>ms and rcservauom
continued to be \01ccd \\llh regard to the adcquaey and clam; of those
changes That questioning dealt \\llh '\lex1co's retention of performance requirements. such as local content and exporting obligations, as condiuom
for the approval of direct in\'eqmcnt, (Coyle, 1987). It aho had to do \\llh
\\hethcr foreign companics-espcc1all) the small and medium-size firms that
1\le,ico \\as seeking to attract- \\OUld be \\lll1ng and able to cope wnh "un
\\ntten" rules and inlormal agreements when com1dering tn\estmems 1111\lcxico (Ca,caneda, I986).
In Ma}, I989. President Carlos Salinas, \\ hose four months in office had
been marked by other strong economic and political iniuativcs, took dec1si\C action to O\ercome such concerns and affirm Mexico's openness to I·DI
He announced maJor re\1siom 111 the regulat1om that had been established
under the 1973 Investment La\\. Those rev1s1ons consllluted a s1gnif1cam liberali,ation of the rules go\ernmg foreign direct investment in Me\lCO.
The ne\\ rules permit foreign investors to hold 100 percent O\\ner,hip of
busmesscs in 73 percem of the 754 economic activities that comprise the Me,ican economy. This includes several key industries-such as food, beverages,
and tobacco; texules, apparel , and leather; lumber and paper production;
machinery; chemicals; and tourism, i.e., hotels and restaurants-in which
majority foreign O\\nership was formally restricted. Moreover, investments
58
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in those sectors will no longer requi re formal review and authorization by
the Mexican government.
Foreigners will also be allowed to acquire I00 percent ownership in the
agricultural and livestock, construction, pri nting and publishi ng, and private educational sectors if their investment project f ulfills the following provisions: I) the investment in fixed assets does not exceed the peso equivalent
of $l00 million during the preoperating period; 2) the project is funded with
resources brought into Mexico from abroad; 3) the project is located outside the nation's three largest metropolitan areas-Mexico City, Guadalajara,
and Monterrey; 4) foreign exchange inflows and outflows are balanced during the first three years of operation; 5) the project is expected to create permanent jobs and provides for worker training; and 6) appropriate technologies
are utilized and environmental regulations are satisfied (Banco Nacional de
Mexico, 1989).
Even in industries (such as transportation, telecommunications, and auto
parts production) where full or majorit} ownership by Mexicans continues
to be required, foreign lll\'eSt0rs ma_y no\, obtain and exercise managerial
control of companies that need infusions of capital. This can be accomplished
through the establishment of trum (fideicomisos), whose shares can be acquired by foreigners and uulized to operate the businesses involved. However,
those shares must be ~old lO 'vlexican investors within twenty years.
These trusts, as ,,ell as other foreign mvestments that are not pecifically
exempted by sectoral designations, still must be reviewed by Mexico's ational Foreign Investment Commission and approved by the Mini try of Commerce and Indus1rial Development. But that process is 10 be simplified and
accelerated, so that appro,al \viii be automatic unless the Commis ion
responds within 45 days after application (Mohn, 1989). The new regulations also permit foreign mvestors 10 remit 100 percem of the profits from
Mexican operations (1111ernational Trade Commission, 1989).

Pri rntiLation and Foreign Direct lme~tmcnt

----'

The transfer of state-owned busmesses to pm·ate hands is an important
component of Mexico's attempt to overhaul m economy. The government
has stated that the principal aim of this prh atizatton movement i to hift
scarce public resources from investment 111111dus1ry to cntically needed health,
education, and infrastructure proJects: but Mexican government official and
executives of the state firms have conceded that they are al o looking 10 private ownership and management 10 modernize and impro\·e the efficiency
of those enterprises (Fortune, 1990).
The Salinas adm inistration has linl--ed its ne\, receptiveness lO FO i to the
privatization program by inviting fo reign in\'estors to buy into Mexico's public
sector. This invitation encompa ses several of the fo rmer "sacred cows" of
Mexican nationalism. Th us, control of the nation's largest airli ne, Mexicana
Nacional de Aviacion, was tran ferred to private Mexican, U.S. and British
investors in August, 1989, as the government 's holdings were reduced from
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58 to 40 percent. That arrangement further provided for the government's
total withdrawal within three years, at which time foreign investors could
acquire a majority stake in the airline (Wall Street Journal, September 15,
1989). President Salinas subsequently ordered what has been billed as "the
largest privatization in Latin American history," the sale of Telefonos de
Mexico (Telemex). Foreign investors will be allowed to acquire up to 49 percent ownership in this national telephone company (Wall Street Journal, June
7, 1990).
Perhaps the most symbolically- ignificant privatization action underway
in Mexico involves the banking system. The Salinas government has recently announced that Mexico's commercial banks, which had been nationalized in 1982, would be "re-privatized." Although foreign investment will
be limited to 30 percent of the equit} of those banks, the denationalization
of this politically-sensitive sector of the economy is regarded as strong evidence of Mexico's new commnment to private enterprise (Wall Street Journal, October I, 1990).
The Outlook

It is clear that Mexico's posture toward foreign direct investment has undergone a dramatic change, but the impact of that transformation still is uncertain. This is due in part to the recency of the liberalization movement,
particularly its official and more extensive aspects which were not introduced
until mid-1989. Although the Mexican government has reported a modest
increase (relative to previous years) in the amount of FOi approved since
that time and a sharp increase in 111quiries from prospective investors, this
data is too limited 10 be conclusive (Wall Street Journal, March 9, 1990).
However, the record of FOi in Mexico over the past fifteen years indicates that changes 111 government policies and practices do have an effect
upon such investment. As noted previous!,, the enactment of a restrictive
foreign 111vestment law in I973 \\as followed by a decrease in FOi. When
Mexico persisted in applying that la\\ through the early 1980s, it experienced
a drop in FD! which far exceeded the decline in the rest of the debt-ridden
and economically-stagnant Latin American region. Conversely, FOi 111 Mexico increased relative to Latin America as a whole after the Mexican government began relaxing its restriction on such investments in 1985.
This historical record lends support to the Mexican government's current
campaign to appeal to foreign investor by further reducing legal and
procedural controls on FD!. And even though the evidence is prelimina ry,
the investment plans of a number of companies suggest that they are responding favorably to that campaign.
The U.S.-based respondents include Ford Motor Company, General Electric, Marriot, and Proctor & Gamble, who collectively expect to invest approximately $1 billion in developing or expandi ng facilities in Mexico. Several
European companies, such as Nestle, BASF, and Volkswagen have likewise
announced their intention to substantially increase their Mexican investments
(Busi ness Weck, August 28, 1989).
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The Japanese have been somewhat more cautious. Despite the Mexican
government's efforts to attract investment from Japan, Japanese investment
in Mexico has been mainly or the "maquiladora" type, i.e., small-scale assembly operations along the U.S. border and has accounted for only about
one percent or Japan's worldwide direct investment. However, in what may
be a breakthrough toward larger-scale Japanese projects, Nissan Motor Company has recently undertaken a $1 billion expansion or its automaking facilities in Mexico.
While these early responses are encouraging, the success or Mexico's endeavor to auract more FOi is by no means assured. Thus far, most or the
foreign firms that have reacted positively to the changes in Mexico's investment climate are large, sophisticated multinationals, whose managers are
"veterans" in terms o r operating in that nation. There has as yet been no
clear evidence or comparable enthusiasm on the part or mailer companies
or those that have not prev1ousl 1 invested in Mexico.
This may be md1cat1\e or possible flaws m !'vtexico's foreign direct investment and overall economic development strategies. One such problem has
to do with the legal character or the I989 changes in FOi regulations. Those
changes were accomplished via a presidential act which amended previous
regulations and re-classified certain mdustrie , as oppo ed to the enactment
or new foreign investment legi lat1on to replace the 1973 la\,. While that approach enabled the Salinas admi111stration to circumvent lefti t opposition
to a more substanme overhaul or the nation' investment tatutes, it appears
to have left a question m the mind or some prospective foreign investor
regarding the depth and permanence or '\llexico's move toward an open-door
policy (Euromone) ... , December, 1989).
Government official and business e,ecutive from other countne have
also expre sed re ervations about Mexico's capacity to absorb and productively utilize large inflows of direct investment capital at the present time.
The inadequacy of the country's infrastructure is frequently mentioned a
a basis for such reservations, but this may well be a tip-of-the iceberg reference to broader concerns regarding '\llex1co's economic and political situation.
In that respect, the crucial quest1om for foreign ime tor are first, \vhether
the recently-launched reform and restructuring of the Me,-1can economy can
overcome the deep-seated lethargy and inefficiencies that gre\, out or se\'eral decades of oppressive government control, bureaucratization, and protectionism; and, secondly, \,hether the Salinas administration can ho\,
progress in alleviaung Mexico's enormou problems or unemployment and
poverty oon enough to avoid a nationalistic backla h or a political upheaval.

lmplicalion
The effects of its altered policie toward foreign direct inve tment are of
utmost importa nce to Mexico. The nation i in desperate need of capital to
finance its ambitious privatization and economic development programs.
While the February, 1990, accord with it foreign creditors has provided ome
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relief from its crushing debt burden, the prospects for additional loans from
foreign banks are very limited and the necessity to control inflation virtually
precludes investment funding through internal monetary expansion. The Mexican government, therefore, is counting heavil} upon an upsurge in FDI to
supply much of the fresh capital which the country requires. It also is hoping that such a vote of confidence from foreign investors will prod Mexican
residents into repatriating the estimated 50 billion dollars which they have
stashed abroad (Euromone) ... , I989).
As noted previously, the United States also has a substantial stake in Mexico's new approach to FD!, as well as m ns broader effort to rejuvenate its
economy. U.S. companies account for approximately two-thirds of all foreign direct investment in Mexico. f'or many of those companies, the abilit,
to carry out low-cost production operatton, m the border-area maquiladoras
and el ewhere in Mexico is essenttal to their capab1lny to compete both globally and m the U.S. market itself. '\,1oreover, Mexico's attracti\eness as a
production site for products 10 be sold m the U.S. will become even greater
when the two nauons consummate the free-trade agreement which is now
being negotiated.
In addition to its usefulness as a production sue for external market , Mexico offers U.S. investors a prom1smg internal market. Mexico's eighty-five
million people place it among the top ten na11on of the world m population. The low incomes of the maJ0nt} of l\1exicans and the economic stagnation and declining purchasing power of the past several years have imposed
a tight ceiling on sales of consumer products, but a continuation of the recent improvements in the economic situation could release a huge pent-up
demand for such goods. Progress in the government's plans fo r prhatization and subsequent modernizatton of the country's industrial sector a nd infrastructure should also generate an enormous need for capnal goods.
01wi1hs1andmg their significance, the e investment prospects for U.S.
companies are only part of the U.S. interest in the result of Mexico's dramatic shift toward a more open and market-directed economy. As a consequence of geographic proximity and the extensive economic ties discussed
earlier in this paper, the United States has become highly\ ulnerable to economic condmon and trends in Mexico.
This U.S.-Mex1can economic connec11on has many positive dimensions,
but the calamitous state of the l\llex1can economy during the past decade has
focussed attent ion upon the adverse effects\\ hich the U.S. might e,perience
if Mexico's current endeavors 10 reform and stimulate its economy should
fail. The most dras11c of these potential effects could be an increased flood
of illegal immigratton 10 the U.S. and an e,pansion of the cross-border flo,,
of narcotics; but a multitude of U.S. businesses and workers that have become dependent upon commercial relations with Mexico would also suffer
from any funher deterioration of that country's economic health and stability.
Finally, it sho uld be pointed out that other Latin American natio ns, including Argentina , Brazil , a nd Venezuela, seem to be following Mexico's
lead by experimenting with the privatization of their business sectors and
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the removal of restrictions on FDI. It may well be, therefore, that the future
course of the Latin American economies, the nature of their economic systems, and their relations with the rest of the world will be heavily influenced
by the effectiveness and consequences of Mexico's new quest for foreign direct
investment.
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